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Recent Civil Decisions of the
United States Supreme Court:
The 2002-2003 Term
Charles H. Whitebread

T

he past term of the United States Supreme Court was dramatic, unexpected, and produced constitutional decisions
that affect the nature and fabric of our society. The term
had three or four “star” cases: the approval of affirmative
action, the striking down of bans on gay sexual relations, the
U-turn in the Court’s federalism revolution, and the restriction
on punitive damage awards. These decisions and the other rulings in constitutional law outside the criminal field made up
the bulk of the Court’s opinions for the 2002-2003 term.1
FIRST AMENDMENT: INTENTIONAL
MISREPRESENTATIONS IN CHARITABLE SOLICITATIONS

In Illinois v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc.,2 a unanimous
Court held that the First Amendment leaves open fraud claims
based on nondisclosure if charitable solicitations are accompanied by misleading statements regarding what percentage of
donations fundraisers will retain for themselves. The Illinois
Attorney General filed a complaint against a solicitor raising
funds for a charitable organization, alleging common-law and
statutory claims for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty on the
grounds that the solicitor misrepresented to donors that a large
part of their donations would be given to the charity, when in
fact only 15%-20% actually were. The charitable solicitor
moved to dismiss the fraud claims, “urging that they were
barred by the First Amendment.” Based on precedent, specifically Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,3 Secretary
of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co.,4 and Riley v. National
Federation of Blind of N.C., Inc.,5 the Court recognized that “had
the complaint against Telemarketers charged fraud based solely
on the percentage of donations the fundraisers would retain, or
their failure to alert potential donors to their fee arrangements,” it would dismiss the case. However, the complaint
made different allegations, ones that “target misleading affirmative misrepresentations about how donations will be used.”
The Court concluded that First Amendment precedent did not
protect these misrepresentations.
FIRST AMENDMENT: SYMBOLIC CONDUCT

In Virginia v. Black,6 the Court determined that a Virginia
statute banning cross burning with the intent to intimidate violated the First Amendment because it treated the act of the

Footnotes
1. For a more in-depth review of the decisions of the past term, see
CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD, RECENT DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT, 2002-2003 (Amer. Acad. of Jud. Educ. 2003).
2. 123 S. Ct. 1829 (2003).
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cross burning as prima facie evidence of intent. The statute
provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person or persons,
with the intent of intimidating any person or group of persons,
to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the property of
another, a highway or other public place.” It further states,
“Any such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of
an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons.”
Respondents were separately convicted under this statute. The
majority of the Court determined that cross burnings fall into a
category of proscribed speech. In making this determination,
the Court noted that states may “ban a ‘true threat[:]’ . . . statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious
expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence
to a particular individual or group of individuals.” The speaker
need not intend to carry out the threat, rather “the prohibition
. . . protects individuals from the fear of violence and from the
disruption that fear engenders, in addition to protecting people
from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.”
The majority concluded that the Virginia statute “does not run
afoul of the First Amendment insofar as it bans cross burning
with intent to intimidate.” Yet, the Court still determined the
statute to be unconstitutional.
Justice O’Connor, writing for a plurality, said, “The prima
facie evidence provision, as interpreted by the jury instruction,
renders the statute unconstitutional.” Because the “jury
instruction is the Model Jury instruction, and because the
Supreme Court of Virginia had the opportunity to expressly
disavow the jury instruction, the jury instruction’s construction
of the prima facie provisions ‘is a ruling on a question of state
law that is binding on us as though the precise words had been
written into’ the statute.” Justice Scalia concluded that the
Court “should vacate and remand the judgment to the Virginia
Supreme Court so that the court can have an opportunity
authoritatively to construe the prima-facie-evidence provision.” Justice Souter, also concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part, said that no “exception should save Virginia’s
law from unconstitutionality under the holding in R.A.V. v. St.
Paul,7 or any acceptable variation of it.” The statute discriminates against expression based on content, he said, and the
prima facie evidence provision merely “skews the statute
toward suppressing ideas.” Justice Thomas dissented, arguing

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

444 U.S. 620 (1980).
467 U.S. 947 (1984).
487 U.S. 781 (1988).
123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003).
505 U.S. 377 (1992).

that “this statute prohibits only conduct, not expressions” and
“the fact that the statute permits a jury to draw an inference of
intent to intimidate from the cross burning itself presents no
constitutional problem.” In his view, an inference “does not
compel a specific conclusion,” and there is no “procedural
consequence of shifting the burden of production.” It neither
chills speech nor violates “due process.”
FIRST AMENDMENT: CORPORATE CONTRIBUTIONS TO
POLITICAL CANDIDATES

tions exhibit.” Similarly, in
Austin v. Michigan Chamber
of Commerce,12 the Court
“sustained Michigan’s ban
on direct corporate contribution, even though the
ban ‘included within its
scope closely held corporations that do not possess
vast reservoirs of capital.’”

[T]he Court
determined that
a Virginia statute
banning cross
burning with the
intent to intimidate
violated the First
Amendment . . . .

Federal law “makes it ‘unlawful . . . for any corporation
whatever . . . to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with’ certain federal elections.”8 The statute does
allow the creation of political action committees (PACs), however, for the “administration, and solicitation of contributions.” In Federal Election Comm’n v. Beaumont,9 the Court,
with Justice Souter writing for the majority, held the ban on
direct corporate contributions under 2 U.S.C. § 441b, even as
applied to nonprofit advocacy corporations, does not violate
the First Amendment.
The Court begins with the history of and purposes behind
the corporate contribution laws, stating, “Any attack on the
federal prohibition of direct corporate political contributions
goes against the current of a century of congressional efforts to
curb corporations’ potentially ‘deleterious influences on federal elections.’” Citing to Federal Elections Comm’n v. National
Right to Work Comm’n.,10 the Court said that prior decision “all
but decided the issue against” the nonprofit group’s position.
National Right to Work involved “the provision of § 441b
restricting a nonstock corporation to its membership when
soliciting contributions to its PAC.” In National Right to Work,
the Court “considered whether a nonprofit advocacy corporation without members of the usual sort could be held to violate the law by soliciting donations to its PAC from any individual who had at one time contributed to the corporation.”
The Court held that solicitation beyond “members” violated
section 441b and that the prohibition was not invalid under
the First Amendment. The Court concluded that “the congressional judgment to regulate corporate political involvement ‘warrants considerable deference’ and ‘reflects a permissible assessment of the dangers posed by [corporations] to the
electoral process.’”
The Court noted that “later cases have repeatedly acknowledged, without questioning, the reading of National Right to
Work as generally approving the § 441b prohibition on direct
contributions, even by nonprofit corporations ‘without great
financial reserves.’” In Federal Election Comm’n v. National
Conservative Political Action Committee,11 the Court reaffirmed
“that Congress might include, along with labor unions and
corporations traditionally prohibited from making contributions to political candidates, membership corporations, though
contributions by the latter might not exhibit all of the evil that
contributions by traditional economically organized corpora-

In Virginia v. Hicks,13 a unanimous Court found Virginia’s
Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority’s (RRHA)
trespassing policy, which resulted in a conviction for trespass
of Kevin Hicks, was not facially invalid under the First
Amendment’s overbreadth doctrine. The RRHA owns and
operates a housing development for low-income residents
called Whitcomb Court. The streets were closed to public use.
The RRHA also enacted a policy authorizing Richmond police,
to serve notice, either orally or in writing, to any person who
is found on the RRHA’s property when “such person is not a
resident, employee, or such person cannot demonstrate a legitimate business or social purpose for being on the premises.
Such notice shall forbid the person from returning to the property.” After notification, a person could be arrested.
The Court noted that under Members of City Council of Los
Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent14 and Broadrick v. Oklahoma,15
the overbreadth doctrine is an exception to the normal rule
regarding the standards for facial challenges, and that a showing that a law punishes a “substantial” amount of protected
free speech, “judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep . . . suffices to invalidate all enforcement of that
law, ‘until and unless a limiting construction or partial invalidation so narrows it as to remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected expression.’”
The Court asserted that Hicks had not made a showing that
the RRHA policy as a whole was unconstitutional, even assuming the unlawfulness of the policy’s “unwritten” rule that
demonstrating and leafleting at Whitecomb Court requires permission. As for the written provision authorizing the police to
arrest those who return to Whitcomb Court after receiving a
barment notice, the Court concluded that this provision “certainly” does not violate the First Amendment as applied to persons whose post-notice entry is not for the purpose of engaging
in constitutionally protected speech. The Court said that this
policy had nothing to do with the First Amendment, and was
sufficiently similar to a person being lawfully banned from a
public park for vandalizing it and then reentering the park to
participate in a political demonstration. Simply, “[h]ere, as
there, it’s Hicks’ nonexpressive conduct—his entry in violation
of the notice-barment rule—not his speech, for which he is

8.
9.
10.
11.

12.
13.
14.
15.

2 U.S.C. § 441b(a).
123 S. Ct. 2200 (2003).
459 U.S. 197 (1982).
470 U.S. 480 (1985).

FIRST AMENDMENT:
OVERBREADTH DOCTRINE

494 U.S. 652 (1990).
123 S. Ct. 2191 (2003).
466 U.S. 789 (1984).
413 U.S. 601 (1973).
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punished as a trespasser.”
Most importantly, both the
notice-barment rule and the
“legitimate business or
social purpose” rule apply
to all persons who enter the
streets of Whitcomb Court,
not just to those who seek to
engage in expression.
“Hicks has not shown,
based on the record in this
case, that the RRHA trespass
policy as a whole prohibits a ‘substantial’ amount of protected
speech in relation to its many legitimate applications,” the
Court concluded.

claim—the CTEA’s extension of existing copyrights violated
the First Amendment—the Court noted that the Copyright
Clause and First Amendment were adopted close in time and
this, according to the Court, indicates “copyright’s purpose is
to promote the creation and publication of free expression” by
“establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression.”
Furthermore, “copyright law contains built-in First
Amendment accommodations.” First, “it distinguishes
between ideas and expression and makes only the latter eligible for copyright protection.” Second, “the ‘fair use’ defense
allows the public to use not only facts and ideas contained in
a copyrighted work, but also expression itself in certain circumstances.”

FIRST AMENDMENT: COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION ACT

In United States v. American Library Association,18 the Court
found that Congress’s condition that public libraries use filters
on their computers to block internet access to obscene material and child pornography to secure federal funding, contained
in the Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA), does not violate the First Amendment, nor is it an invalid exercise of its
spending power. Chief Justice Rehnquist announced the judgment of the Court and wrote the plurality opinion, in which
Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and Thomas joined. Justices
Kennedy and Breyer filed concurring opinions. Justice Souter
filed a dissent, in which Justice Ginsburg joined. The plurality recognized that “Congress has wide latitude to attach conditions to the receipt of federal assistance in order to further its
policy objectives,” with the caveat, of course, that it may “not
‘induce’ the recipient ‘to engage in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional.’” In determining whether the
restriction violates the First Amendment, the Court determined that a heightened judicial standard of review was
“incompatible with the discretion that public libraries must
have to fulfill their traditional missions”—“Public library staffs
necessarily consider content in making collection decisions
and enjoy broad discretion in making them.” Furthermore, the
possibility that a filter might “overblock” does not render the
statute unconstitutional. The Court wrote, “Assuming that
such erroneous blocking presented constitutional difficulties,
any such concerns are dispelled by the ease with which patrons
may have the filtering software disabled.”
The Court next addressed the issue of whether the statute
“imposes an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal assistance.” It noted that “under this doctrine, ‘the government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that
infringes his constitutionally protected . . . freedom of speech
even if he has no entitlement to that benefit.’” The Court concluded that it need not decide that issue because, “even assuming that appellees may assert an ‘unconstitutional conditions’
claim, this claim would fail on the merits.” The Court relied
on its decision in Rust v. Sullivan,19 where it upheld Congress’s
restriction on using federal funds in programs that provided

The Court
concluded that
the Copyright
Term Extension Act
complied with the
“limited times”
requirement of the
Constitution . . . .

The Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution,
Article I, § 8, cl. 8, provides as to copyrights: “Congress shall
have Power . . . to promote the Progress of Science . . . by
securing [to Authors] for limited Times . . . the exclusive Right
to their . . . Writings.” In Eldred v. Ashcroft,16 Justice Ginsburg,
writing for a 7-2 Court, held the Copyright Term Extension
Act’s (CTEA) extension of existing copyrights does not exceed
Congress’s power under the Copyright Clause or violate the
First Amendment. The CTEA,17 enacted by Congress in 1998,
extended the duration of copyrights by 20 years. Now, “for
works created by identified natural persons, the term now lasts
from creation until 70 years after the author’s death” and “for
anonymous works, pseudonymous works, and works made for
hire, the term is 95 years from publication or 120 years from
creation, whichever expires first.”
The Court concluded the CTEA complied with the “limited
times” requirement of the Constitution and, furthermore, was
a “rational exercise of the legislative authority conferred by the
Copyright Clause.” The Court adopted a traditional “rationality” test, rather than a three-part test that engages a heightened
scrutiny as encouraged by Justice Breyer in his dissent, because
“’it is not [the Court’s] role to alter the delicate balance
Congress has labored to achieve.’” The Court added, “The
CTEA reflects judgments of a kind Congress typically makes,
judgments [the Court] cannot dismiss as outside the
Legislature’s domain.” The passage of the CTEA, and its
extended time frame for copyright protection, clearly reflects
Congress’s intention of ensuring that “American authors
would receive the same copyright protection in Europe as their
European counterparts.”
Moving to the petitioners’ First Amendment claim, the
Court rejected petitioners’ arguments (1) that “the CTEA is a
content-neutral regulation of speech that fails heightened judicial review under the First Amendment” and (2) “for imposition of uncommonly strict scrutiny on a copyright scheme that
incorporates its own speech-protective purposes and safeguards.” Considering the narrower version of petitioners’

16. 123 S.Ct. 1505 (2003).
17. Pub. L. 105-298 § 102(b) and (d) amending 17 U.S.C. §§ 302,
304.
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FIRST AMENDMENT: CHILDREN’S INTERNET
PROTECTION ACT

18. 123 S. Ct. 1012 (2003).
19. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).

abortion counseling. The Court recognized, as here, “that ‘the
Government [was] not denying a benefit to anyone, but [was]
instead simply insisting that public funds be spent for the purposes for which they were authorized.’”
FIRST AMENDMENT: PRISONERS’ VISITATION RIGHTS

In Overton v. Bazzetta,20 Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that restrictions on prisoners’ visitation rights do not violate the First Amendment if rationally
related to a legitimate penological interest. The regulations at
issue in this case were enacted by the Michigan Department of
Corrections and severely restricted the visitation rights of prisoners in order to maintain better control during visitation periods and to prevent smuggling, drug trafficking, and other
harmful conduct, some of which was displayed before children
who were visitors to the prison facilities. The regulations were
challenged as they pertained to prisoners who were only entitled to noncontact visitations. In upholding the regulations,
the Court addressed whether these regulations infringed upon
the constitutional right of association under the First
Amendment, recognizing that the Constitution “protects ‘certain kinds of highly personal relationships.’” The Court noted,
however, “many liberties and privileges enjoyed by other citizens must be surrendered by the prisoner. An inmate does not
retain rights inconsistent with proper incarceration.” The
Court did not “attempt to explore or define” the asserted right
of association because the regulations at issue in this case “bear
a rational relation to legitimate penological interests,” which
“suffices to sustain the regulation in question.”
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE

In Grutter v. Bollinger,21 the Court, in a 5-4 decision,
endorsed Justice Powell’s opinion in Regents of Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke,22 and determined that a law school admission policy
that considers race as only one of many factors in evaluating
applicants to achieve the institution’s goal of a “diverse” student body does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. In
Bakke, Justice Powell wrote that “‘the guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual
and something else when applied to a person of another
color.’” Therefore, both must be accorded the same protection.
When a “governmental” decision touches upon an individual’s
racial or ethnic ground, “he is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.”
The only interest Justice Powell accepted as valid was “the
attainment of a diverse student body,” with the proviso that
“constitutional limitations protecting individual rights may
not be disregarded.” Justice Powell was “careful to emphasize
that in his view race ‘is only one element in a range of factors
a university properly may consider in attaining the goal of a

20.
21.
22.
23.

123 S. Ct. 2162 (2003).
123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003).
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003).

heterogeneous student body.”
The Court in Grutter concluded
that the law school’s admission
program was consistent with
Powell’s Bakke approach—a narrowly tailored system designed to
achieve a diverse student body.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

In Grutter v.
Bollinger, the
Court, in a 5-4
decision,
endorsed Justice
Powell’s opinion
in Bakke . . . .

Addressing the issue of affirmative action, the Court, in Gratz v. Bollinger,23 held an undergraduate admissions policy that assigned a certain number of
“admission” points to individuals based on race or ethnicity
was in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Justice
Rehnquist, writing for a 5-4 Court, reviewed the admission policy of University of Michigan’s College of Literature, Science,
and the Arts. Their policy automatically assigned 20 points to
an applicant in an underrepresented class. First, in light of its
opinion set forth in Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court found that
“diversity” is a valid compelling state interest. However, the
Court determined that the University’s policies were not “narrowly tailored to achieve such an interest.” The Court cited
Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke for the proposition that such
programs “‘preferring members of any one group for no reason
other than race or ethnic origins is discrimination for its own
sake.’” While “race or ethnic background may be deemed a
plus in a particular applicant’s file,” a policy must be “‘flexible
enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity in light of
the particular qualifications of each applicant.’” The Court
found that the university’s current policy “does not provide
such individualized consideration.”
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE: SAME-SEX RELATIONSHIP

In a landmark decision, the Court in Lawrence v. Texas24
held a Texas statute criminalizing certain private, consensual
sexual acts between individuals of the same sex violates their
liberty rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the court
and Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined.
Justice O’Connor filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
Justice Scalia, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Thomas dissented. In its decision, the Court began by recognizing “there
are broad statements of the substantive reach of liberty under
the Due Process Clause in earlier cases.” Following its line of
decisions from Griswold v. Connecticut,25 to Bowers v.
Hardwick,26 the Court said that “our laws and traditions in the
past half century are of most relevance here. These references
show an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.” The Court said “the
emerging recognition should have been apparent when Bowers

24. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
25. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
26. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).

Spring 2003 - Court Review 21

was decided.” While “stare
decisis is essential to the
respect accorded to the
judgments of the Court and
to the stability of the law,” it
is not an inexorable command. The Court concluded, “Bowers was not
correct when it was
decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent.” The
Court overruled Bowers and invalidated the Texas statute.

The Court
concluded,
“Bowers was not
correct when it was
decided, and it is
not correct today.”

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: EQUAL PROTECTION AND
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

In City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope
Foundation,27 Justice O’Connor wrote the opinion for the
unanimous court. In this decision, the Court held that a nonprofit housing agency, Buckeye Community Hope Foundation,
failed to state a claim for an equal protection or substantive
due process violation when it alleged the City of Cuyahoga
Falls and its officials violated the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment “in allowing a
site plan approval ordinance to be submitted to the electors of
Cuyahoga Falls through referendum and in rejecting [its]
application for building permits.” The Cuyahoga City Charter
granted voters “the power to approve or reject at the polls any
ordinance or resolution passed by the Council within thirty
days of the ordinance’s passage.” The voters of Cuyahoga,
using this process, stalled the issuance of the building permits
and subsequently passed a referendum repealing an ordinance
allowing Buckeye to construct low-income housing. The Ohio
Supreme Court subsequently declared the referendum unconstitutional and the necessary building permits were issued to
Buckeye. However, Buckeye maintained this action in federal
court for violation of the fourteenth Amendment.
Addressing the equal protection claim first, the Court said,
“We have made clear that proof of racially discriminatory intent
or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.” Buckeye, however, did not claim injury
from the referendum itself, but the “petitioning process.” The
Court concluded that “neither of the official acts [Buckeye]
challenge[s] reflects the intent required to support equal protection liability.” The “City acted pursuant to the requirements
of its charter, which set out a facially neutral petitioning procedure.” Likewise, the city engineer, in refusing to issue the
appropriate permits while the referendum was still pending,
“performed a nondiscretionary, ministerial act.” Buckeye did
not point to any evidence “suggesting these official acts were
themselves motivated by racial animus.” The Court also rejects
Buckeye’s reliance instead on the “allegedly discriminatory
voter sentiment” to show an equal protection violation, stating
“statements made by private individuals in the course of a citizen-driven petition drive, while sometimes relevant . . . do not,

27. 123 S.Ct. 1389 (2003).
28. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
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in and of themselves, constitute state action for the purposes of
the Fourteenth Amendment.” The Court concluded that there
was no evidence presented to show that these private motives
should be attributed to the state.
The Court also found that Buckeye failed to allege a substantive due process violation. Buckeye asserted two grounds
by which the City violated its due process rights: (1) Buckeye
had a “legitimate claim of entitlement to the building permits,
and therefore a property interest in those permits . . . [and] the
City engaged in arbitrary conduct by denying [Buckeye] the
benefit of the plan”; and (2) “submission of an administrative
land-use determination to the charter’s referendum procedures
constitutes per se arbitrary conduct.” The Court did not consider whether Buckeye had a property interest in the permits
“because the city engineer’s refusal to issue the permits while
the petition was pending in no sense constituted egregious or
arbitrary government conduct,” the type of conduct necessary
to find a substantive due process violation. Instead, the city
engineer acted according to the advice of the city attorney and
the city charter. Second, the Court rejects Buckeye’s arguments
of per se arbitrary conduct. The Court has previously refused
to make such a distinction between legislative and administrative referendums, as evidenced in Eastlake v. Forest City
Enterprises, Inc.28 In that case, the Court held that “because all
power stems from the people, ‘a referendum cannot . . . be
characterized as a delegation of power,’ unlawful unless
accompanied by ‘discernable standards.’” The people retain
the power to govern through referendum “with respect to any
matter, legislative or administrative, within the realm of local
affairs.” The Court said that “though the substantive result of
a referendum may be invalid if it is arbitrary and capricious,”
Buckeye was not challenging the referendum itself, merely the
city’s compliance.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT:
EXCESSIVE PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARD

Addressing excessive punitive damages award in a civil
action, the Court in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance,
Co. v. Campbell29 held a punitive damage award of $145 million, where full compensatory damages were $1 million, was
excessive and violated the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of a 6-3 Court, which relied heavily on BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore.30 In Gore, the Court instructed reviewing
courts to consider three guideposts: “(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct; (2) the disparity
between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff
and the punitive damages award; and (3) the difference
between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the
civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.”
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg dissented on grounds
that the Due Process Clause does not constrain the size of
punitive damage awards.

29. 123 S.Ct. 1513 (2003).
30. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).

FEDERALISM: FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT OF 1993

In Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs,31 Justice
Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court, which held that
an individual may sue a state under the family-care provision
of the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), which provides 12
weeks of unpaid leave, as the provision is a valid exercise of
Congress’s power under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court began by noting that “the
Constitution does not provide for federal jurisdiction over
suits against nonconsenting States.” However, “Congress may
. . . abrogate such immunity in federal court if it makes its
intention to abrogate unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute and acts pursuant to a valid exercise of its power under
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” The Court held that here
FMLA clearly “enables employees to seek damages ‘against any
employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State
court of competent jurisdiction.’”32 A “public agency,” as
defined by Congress, “include[s] both ‘the government of a
State or political subdivision thereof’ and ‘any agency of . . . a
State, or a political subdivision of a State.’”33 Furthermore, the
Court determined that FMLA’s enactment was appropriate
under section 5 because it “aims to protect the right to be free
from gender-based discrimination in the workplace.”
FEDERALISM: SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

In Jinks v. Richland County, South Carolina,34 a unanimous
Court, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, held that 28
U.S.C. section 1367(d), which tolls the statute of limitations
for state law claims filed in a federal court under supplemental
jurisdiction, is not unconstitutional even as applied to a state’s
political subdivisions. Petitioner filed an action in federal
court, which included supplemental state claims against the
county for wrongful death and survival. The district court dismissed these claims without prejudice, and petitioner filed a
state action within 30 days of the dismissal. The county
argued these claims were time-barred on the grounds that section 1367(d) is “facially invalid because it exceeds the enumerated powers of Congress” and, even if facially valid,
“should not be interpreted to apply to claims brought against
a State’s political subdivision” because it interferes with their
right to sovereign immunity.
The Court began by recognizing that Article I, section 8 of
the Constitution authorizes Congress “‘to make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
[Congress’s Article I, § 8] Powers and all other Powers vested
by this Constitution in the Government of the United States.’”
The Court found section 1367(d) “necessary,” because it is
“‘conducive to the due administration of justice’ in a federal
court and is ‘plainly adapted’ to that end.” Furthermore, the
Court concluded that section 1367(d) was “’plainly adapted to
the power of Congress to establish the lower federal courts and
provide for the fair and efficient exercise of their Article III
powers.” Neither party suggested that section 1367(d) was a

31.
32.
33.
34.

123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003).
29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2).
§ 203(x), 2611(4)(A)(iii).
123 S.Ct. 1667 (2003).

“pretext” for an improper
[A]n individual
objective or is so attenuated
may sue a state
with Congress’s authority
“as to undermine the enuunder the familymeration of powers set
care provision of
forth in Article I, § 8.”
the Family Medical
The Court also found
that the tolling provision set
Leave Act . . . .
out in section 1367(d) did
not constitute “an impermissible abrogation of ‘sovereign immunity.’” The Court determined that those provisions did not encroach upon a state’s
sovereign immunity as applied to its political subdivisions.
First, as recognized in Alden v. Maine,35 while “Congress lacks
authority under Article I to override a State’s sovereign immunity from suit in its own courts, it may subject a municipality
to suit in state court if that is done pursuant to a valid exercise
of its enumerated powers.” Municipalities do not enjoy the
same constitutional immunity as states.
FEDERALISM: NEGATIVE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE

In Hillside Dairy, Inc. v. Lyons,36 the Court, in an opinion
written by Justice Stevens, held a California state law that burdens or discriminates against out-of-state suppliers is subject
to a challenge under the negative Commerce Clause. It is subject to challenge when it is not expressly immunized to such a
challenge by federal statute, and is subject to a challenge under
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, even when it does not
on its face make a distinction against an individual based on
residency or citizenship. In most of the United States, not
including California, “the minimum price paid to dairy farmers producing raw milk is regulated pursuant to federal marketing orders.” In California, “three related statutes establish
the regulatory structure for milk produced, processed, or sold
in California.” In 1997, the California Department of Food
and Agriculture “amended its plan to require that contributions to the pool be made on some out-of-state purchases.”
Petitioners, out-of-state producers, brought an action challenging the 1997 amendment as discriminatory against them.
California argued that it was exempt from regulation based on
§ 144 of the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act
of 1996.37 Congress passed section 144, which exempts
California only regarding the composition of milk products,
because California’s composition standards exceed some of
those set by the federal Food and Drug Administration.
The Court concluded, based on the plain language of the
statute, that section 144 “does not encompass pricing and pooling laws,” and therefore, “California’s pricing and pooling laws
[are not insulated] from a Commerce Clause challenge.”
Furthermore, the Court also determined that the individual
petitioners were not banned from raising a Privileges and
Immunities Clause challenge. Article IV, section 2 of the

35. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
36. 123 S. Ct. 2142 (2003).
37. 7 U.S.C. § 7254.
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Constitution provides: “The
citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the
several States.” The Court
concluded that, while the
lower courts correctly banned
the corporate petitioners from
raising this argument, the
individual petitioners could
go forward with their claims.
The Court cited to its holding
in Chalker v. Birmingham &
Northwestern R. Co.,38 stating
that it could be interpreted
two ways: (1) the Clause applies “to classifications that are but
proxies for differential treatment against out-of-state residents”;
or (2) it prohibits “any classification with the practical effect of
discriminating against such residents.” The Court concluded
that, in this case, it did not matter which interpretation was correct because under either the absence of an express statement
in the California laws and regulations identifying out-of-state
citizenship as a basis for disparate treatment was not sufficient
for rejecting this claim.

Justice Stevens
concluded that the
“question is
whether there is a
probability that
Maine’s program
was preempted
by the mere
existence of the
federal statute.”

FEDERALISM: STATE MEDICAID REGULATIONS

In Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v.
Walsh,39 the Court determined that the petitioners did not meet
their burden for a preliminary injunction by showing that the
Maine statute providing “supplemental rebate programs to
achieve additional cost savings on Medicaid purchases as well
as purchases made by other needy citizens” (the “Maine Rx
Program”) was preempted by federal law, or that it violated the
negative Commerce Clause. Justice Stevens announced the
judgment of the Court. Prior to 1990, the Medicaid statute did
not “specifically address” outpatient prescription drug coverage. In 1990, Congress created a rebate program for prescription drugs in an amendment contained in the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA 1990). The plan had two
parts: (1) “It imposed a general requirement that, in order to
qualify for Medicaid payments, drug companies must enter into
agreements either with the Secretary or, if authorized by the
Secretary, with individual States, to provide rebates on their
Medicaid sales of outpatient prescription drugs,” and (2) “Once
a drug manufacturer enters into a rebate agreement, the law
requires the State to provide coverage for that drug under its
plan unless the State complies with one of the exclusion or
restriction provisions in the Medicaid Act.” The Court wrote,
“Most relevant to this case, Congress allowed States, ‘as a condition of coverage or payment for a covered outpatient drug,’ §
1396r-8(d)(5), to require approval of the drug before it is dispensed.” In the OBRA 1993, Congress further amended the Act
to allow States to use “formularies” subject to strict limitations.
Justice Stevens concluded that the “question is whether
there is a probability that Maine’s program was preempted by

38. 249 U.S. 522 (1919).
39. 123 S.Ct. 1855 (2003).
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the mere existence of the federal statute.” In analyzing this
question, Justice Stevens focused on “the centerpiece of petitioner’s attack on the Maine Rx Program, [which] is its
allegedly unique use of a threat to impose a prior authorization
requirement on Medicaid sales to coerce manufacturers into
reducing their prices on sales to non-Medicaid recipients.”
However, Justice Stevens recognized that it was petitioners’
burden to show that “no Medicaid purpose” exists, and that a
preliminary injunction is improper “if the program on its face
clearly serves some Medicaid-related goal or purpose.” He
found that three such purposes existed. First, “the program
will provide medical benefits to persons who can be described
as ‘medically needy’ even if they do not qualify for AFDC or SSI
benefits.” Second, “there is a possibility that, by enabling some
borderline aged and infirm persons better access to prescription drugs earlier, Medicaid expenses will be reduced.” And
third, patients will be protected from “inappropriate” prescriptions, and the use of cost-effective medications will be encouraged. While these reasons ultimately might not be enough to
save the statute from preemption, it was “incorrect for the
District Court to assume that any impediment, ‘no matter how
modest,’ to a patient’s ability to obtain the drug of her choice
at the State’s expense would invalidate the Maine Rx Program.”
The Court said that petitioner’s “Commerce Clause challenge focuses on the effects of the rebate agreements that will
follow manufacturer compliance with the program.” The
Court concluded that Maine’s Rx Program “does not regulate
the price of any out-of-state transaction, either by its express
terms or by its inevitable effect.” First, “Maine does not insist
that manufacturers sell their drugs to a wholesaler for a certain
price.” Second, “Maine is not tying the price of its in-state
products to out-of-state products.”
FEDERALISM:
PREEMPTION BY FEDERAL FOREIGN POLICY

In American Insurance Association v. Garamendi,40 Justice
Souter delivered the opinion of the Court, holding California’s
Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act of 1999 (HVIRA), which
requires an insurer doing business in the state to disclose information about policies sold by it or its affiliates in Europe
between 1920 and 1945, was preempted under the foreign
affairs doctrine of federal executive authority to set foreign relations. The Court began by recognizing that the President has
independent authority under the Constitution to decide foreign
policies and that “an exercise of state power that touches on foreign relations must yield to the National Government’s policy.”
The President can execute executive agreements with foreign
countries, requiring no ratification by the Senate or approval by
Congress; this power includes “the settlement of claims.”
In July 2000, the President and German Chancellor
Schroder signed an executive agreement, called the German
Foundation Agreement, to reach a remedy regarding the
numerous unsettled claims individuals had against German
companies that stemmed from the Nazi era in Germany. In
terms of insurance policies, both countries agreed that the

40. 123 S.Ct. 2374 (2003).

German Holocaust Foundation would work with the
International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims
(ICHEIC), a voluntary organization formed in 1998, whose primary purpose is to negotiate with European insurers “to provide
information about unpaid insurance policies issued to
Holocaust victims and settlement of claims brought under
them.”
The German Foundation Agreement does not expressly state
that it preempts laws like HVIRA, leaving the government only
with the argument that preemption rests because of “interference with foreign policy those agreements embody.” Turning to
its decision in Zschering v. Miller,41 in which the majority reasoned “state action with more than incidental effect on foreign
affairs is preempted, even absent any affirmative federal activity in the subject area of the state law, and hence without any
showing of conflict,” the Court concluded that HVIRA is sufficiently in conflict with foreign policy as to require preemption.
First, the Court concluded that resolving Holocaust-era
insurance claims “is a matter well within the Executive’s
responsibility for foreign affairs.” Second, in this instance, the
government has a foreign policy regarding the law addressed by
HVIRA: “the three settlement agreements are enough to illustrate that the consistent Presidential foreign policy has been to
encourage European governments and companies to volunteer
settlement funds in preference to litigation or coercive sanctions.” Finally, the Court determined that HVIRA “conflicts”
with these policies: “California has taken a different tack of
providing regulatory sanctions to compel disclosure and payment, supplemented by a new cause of action for Holocaust
survivors if the other sanctions should fail.”
The Court refused to address whether California’s “iron fist”
approach was superior to the President’s “kid glove” approach
as it is not within its role to make such a determination.
However, it did address the state’s arguments “that even if
HVIRA does interfere with the Executive Branch foreign policy,
Congress authorized state law of this sort in the McCarranFerguson Act, . . . and the more recent U.S. Holocaust Assets
Commission Act of 1998.” The Court rejected both claims.
First, the McCarran-Ferguson Act leaves insurance regulation
generally to the States, but even if HVIRA could be considered
as a law regulating the business of insurance, “a federal statute
directed to implied preemption by domestic commerce legislation cannot sensibly be construed to address preemption by
executive conduct in foreign affairs.” Second, the Holocaust
Commission Act, set up to study and develop a historical
record of the collection and disposition of Holocaust era assets,
clearly focuses on assets held by the Government “and, if anything, the federal Act assumed it was the National
Government’s responsibility to deal with returning those
assets.” Furthermore, the reference to “compiling information”
specifically states that “to the degree information is available,”
and does not authorize “state sanctions interfering with federal
efforts to resolve such claims.”

41.
42.
43.
44.
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STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

A unanimous
Court . . . held that
direct evidence of
discrimination is not
required to obtain a
mixed-motive
instruction under
Title VII . . . .

A unanimous Court in
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa42
held direct evidence of discrimination is not required
to obtain a mixed-motive
instruction under Title VII
of the Civil Right Act of
1964. The Court’s decision
in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins43 left open the issue of when the burden of proof may
be shifted to an employer to prove the affirmative defense of
legitimate purpose in a mixed-motive case. In its 1991 Act,
Congress addressed this issue with two new provisions. The
first established an alternative for proving that an “unlawful
employment practice” occurred, allowing an employee to
move forward with his or her action once they had established
“an unlawful employment practice.”44 If discrimination is
proven, an employer can affirmatively show it would have
taken the same action even absent the impermissible factor.
The limited defense does not absolve the employer of liability,
but limits the remedies of the plaintiff.45 After the 1991 Act
was enacted, the Courts of Appeals “divided over whether a
plaintiff must prove by direct evidence that an impermissible
consideration was a ‘motivating factor.’”
In determining that direct evidence was not required, the
Court first turned to the text of the statute and determined that
section 2000e-2(m) clearly states that an employee “need only
‘demonstrate’ that an employer used a forbidden consideration
with respect to ‘any employment practice,’” not “make a heightened showing through direct evidence.” Second, the Court
concluded that Congress “explicitly defined the term ‘demonstrates’ in the 1991 Act, leaving little doubt that no special evidentiary showing is required.” Third, the Court noted that
“[t]he adequacy of circumstantial evidence also extends beyond
civil cases; we have never questioned the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in support of a criminal conviction, even
though proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required.” Finally,
the Court also noted, that the use of the term “demonstrate” in
other provisions of Title VII tends also to show that “§ 2000e2(m) does not incorporate a direct evidence requirement.”46
CIVIL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT

In Moseley v. Victoria’s Secret Catalogue, Inc.,47 the Court
determined that under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
(FTDA), objective proof of actual injury to the economic value
of a famous mark is required for relief, as opposed to a presumption of harm arising from a subjective “likelihood of dilution” standard. In 1995, through the FTDA, Congress
amended section 43 of the Trademark Act of 1946 to provide a

45. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
46. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
47. 537 U.S. 418 (2003).
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remedy for the “dilution of
famous marks.” The Court
first noted that, unlike
infringement law, dilution
law does not stem from
common law and is not
motivated by consumer
protection. Therefore, competition between the two
enterprises is irrelevant.
The Court noted that to
avoid
possible
First
Amendment
challenges,
Congress included two provisions, one to allow use of
a mark in comparative
advertising, and the other to allow the use of a mark for noncommercial use. The committee report stated that the “purpose [of the bill] is to protect famous trademarks from subsequent uses that blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish
or disparage it, even in the absence of a likelihood of confusion.” The Court reasoned that the contrast between the state
statutes, which expressly refer to both “injury to business reputation” and to “dilution of the distinctive quality of a trade
name or trademark,” and the federal statute, which refers only
to the latter, supports a narrower reading of the FTDA. The relevant text of the FTDA provides that “the owner of a famous
mark is entitled to injunctive relief against another person’s
commercial use of a mark or trade name if that use ‘causes
dilution of the distinctive quality’ of the famous mark. . . .”
This text unambiguously requires a showing of actual dilution,
rather than a likelihood of dilution. The Court cautioned that
its conclusion does not mean direct proof of dilution, such as
an actual loss of sales, is always necessary; circumstantial evidence of dilution may be sufficient in a given case.

“[U]nder the
established
interpretative
canons of noscitur a
sociis and ejusdem
generis, . . . the
general words are
construed to
embrace only
objects similar in
nature . . . .

CIVIL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
SOCIAL SECURITY ACT

In Washington State Dept. of Social and Health Services v.
Guardianship Estate of Keffeler,48 the Court, in a unanimous
opinion written by Justice Souter, determined that the
Washington State Department of Social and Health Services
(DSHS), as payee representative to children beneficiaries of
Social Security benefits under both Social Security Income
scheme and Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance plan,
is not barred by 42 U.S.C. section 407(a) from recovering its
initial expenditures under state law for the care and maintenance of such beneficiaries in their state foster-care program.
Washington, through the DSHS, makes foster care available to
abandoned, abused, neglected, or orphaned children who have
no other guardians or custodians available. Although the state
pays for such care, it has a policy “to attempt to recover the
costs of foster care from the parents of the children.” The
department adopted a regulation providing “that public benefits for a child, including under SSI or OASDI, ‘shall be used on
behalf of the child to help pay for the cost of foster care

48. 537 U.S. 371 (2003).
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received.’” Section 407(a), commonly referred to as the “antiattachment” provision, provides, “The right of any person to
any future payment under this subchapter shall not be transferable or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of the moneys paid or payable or rights existing under this subchapter
shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or
other legal process, or to the operation of any bankruptcy or
insolvency law.”
A class of children who are in the department’s foster care
and who receive OASDI or SSI benefits brought an action in
state court alleging that the “department’s use of their Social
Security benefits to reimburse itself for the costs of foster care”
violated this provision. The Court determined it does not.
The Court began by stating, “Section 407(a) protects SSI and
OASDI benefits from ‘execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process,’” not “creditor-type acts.” It recognizes that “the questions to be answered in resolving this
case, then, do not go to the State’s character as a creditor . . .
[but to] whether the department’s effort to become a representative payee, or its use of respondents’ Social Security benefits
. . . amounts to employing an ‘execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process.’” The Court easily dismissed
the possibilities that the state’s activities involve an “execution,
levy, attachment, or garnishment,” as these are legal “terms of
art” and refer to “formal procedures” by which a person gains
control over the property of another. The Court said “the case
boils down to whether the department’s manner of gaining
control of the federal fund involves ‘other legal process.’” The
Court determined the answer is no: “[U]nder the established
interpretative canons of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis,
‘where general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only
objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the
preceding specific words.’” In this instance, since the phrase
“other legal process” is used after execution, levy, attachment,
and garnishment, therefore, at a minimum, section 402(a)
“would seem to require utilization of some judicial or quasijudicial mechanism . . . by which control over property passes
from one person to another.”
CIVIL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: ERISA

In Kentucky Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller,49 a unanimous Court, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, found that
Kentucky’s “Any Willing Provider” statutes, which mandate
that health insurers not discriminate against willing providers,
were saved from preemption by ERISA under the new rule
adopted by the Court to determine whether a state law “regulates insurance” under 29 U.S.C. section 1144(b)(2)(A). State
laws are saved from preemption under section 1144(b)(2)(A)
if they are laws that “regulate insurance.” Making a clean
break from the McCarran-Ferguson factors it had used previously, the Court decided that “for a state law to be deemed a
‘law . . . [that] regulates insurance’ under § 1144(b)(2)(A), it
must satisfy two requirements. First, the state law must be
specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance . . . .
Second . . . the state law must substantially affect the risk pool-

49. 123 S.Ct. 1471 (2003).

ing arrangement between the insurer and the insured.”
Although the McCarran-Ferguson factors were never an
“essential component” of the analysis surrounding section
1144(b)(2)(A), the Court had used them to “buttress” its decisions. This has “misdirected attention, failed to provide clear
guidance to lower federal courts, and . . . added little to the
relevant analysis.”
CIVIL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION:
HIGHWAY SAFETY ACT

In Pierce County v. Guillen,50 a unanimous Court found that
23 U.S.C. section 409, which protects information “compiled or
collected” in connection with certain federal highway safety
programs from being discovered or admitted into evidence, is a
valid exercise of Congress’s authority under the Commerce
Clause. The Highway Safety Act of 1966 was enacted “to
improve the safety of our Nation’s highways by encouraging
closer federal and state cooperation with respect to road
improvement projects.” This act includes the Hazard
Elimination Program, “which provides state and local governments with funding to improve the most dangerous sections of
their roads.” To implement the Hazard Elimination Program,
Congress adopted section 409 to protect certain data from discovery. The Court analyzes the scope of section 409 with
regards to two well-recognized principles: (1) “Evidentiary
privileges must be construed narrowly because privileges
impede the search for the truth,” and (2) “‘When Congress acts
to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amendment to
have real and substantial effect.’” With these principles in
mind, the Court concluded section 409 protects all documents
“compiled or collected for § 152 purposes, but does not protect
information that was originally compiled or collected for purposes unrelated to § 152 and that is currently held by the agencies that compiled or collected it, even if the information was at
some point ‘collected’ by another agency for § 152 purposes.”
After determining the scope of section 409, the Court
addressed its constitutionality. Relying on the Commerce
Clause and Congress’s “well established . . . [power] to ‘regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce,’” the Court
found that “both the original § 409 and the 1995 amendment
can be viewed as legislation aimed at improving safety in the
channels of commerce and increasing protection for the instrumentalities of interstate commerce.” The adoption of section
409 was reasonable to eliminate the “unforeseen side effect of
the information-gathering requirement of § 152” and encourage “more diligent efforts to collect the relevant information,
more candid discussions of hazardous locations, better
informed decision making, and, ultimately, greater safety of the
Nation’s roads.”

Housing Act. It imposes lia“When Congress
bility on a corporation, not
creates a tort
its directors and officers, for
discrimination by one of its
action, it legislates
employees or agents. The
against a legal
respondents brought an
background of
action against the sole
shareholder, president, and
ordinary tortlicensed “officer/broker” of
related vicarious
a real estate agency, claiming
liability rules . . . .
he was “vicariously liable in
one or more of these capacities” for a real estate agent’s
discriminatory conduct. The Fair Housing Act forbids “‘any
person or other entity whose business includes engaging in residential real estate-related transactions to discriminate.’”52 It
states that a “‘person’ includes, for example, individuals, corporations, partnerships, associations, labor unions, and other
organizations,” but, it says nothing about vicarious liability.53
The Court noted that “it is well established that the Act provides for vicarious liability” as “an action brought for compensation by a victim of housing discrimination is, in effect, a tort
action.” In finding that the traditional rules of vicarious liability apply, the Court said, “When Congress creates a tort action,
it legislates against a legal background of ordinary tort-related
vicarious liability rules and consequently intends its legislation
to incorporate those rules.” Furthermore, it “found no convincing argument in support of the Ninth Circuit’s decision to
apply nontraditional vicarious liability principles.”
CIVIL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: TRIBAL ACTIONS
UNDER 42 U.S.C. SECTION 1983

In Meyer v. Holley,51 Justice Breyer delivered the opinion for
a unanimous Court holding that the traditional principles of
vicarious liability apply to actions brought under the Fair

In Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop
Community of the Bishop Colony,54 the Court held the tribe’s
complaint was not actionable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983,
because a tribe did not qualify as a “person” for the purposes of
that statute. Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the
Court, in which all the justices except Justice Stevens, who
wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment, joined. The tribe
filed a section 1983 action against the county alleging that by
acting beyond the scope of its jurisdiction and without authorization of law in executing a search warrant to obtain employment records from its casino, the county violated the tribe’s and
its corporation’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and
the tribe’s right to self-government. Section 1983 permits “‘citizens’ and ‘other persons within the jurisdiction’ of the United
States to seek legal and equitable relief from ‘persons’ who,
under the color of state law, deprive them of federally protected
rights.” The Court determined, however, that a tribe is not a
“citizen” for the purposes of maintaining a section 1983 action.
The Court first turned to its decision in Will v. Michigan Dept.
of State Police,55 where it held that “a State is not a ‘person’
amenable to suit under § 1983,” and reasoned, “‘Congress did
not intend to override well-established immunities or defenses

50. 537 U.S. 129 (2003).
51. 537 U.S. 280 (2003).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a).

53. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(d).
54. 537 U.S. 701 (2003).
55. 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
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under the common law,’
including ‘the doctrine of sovereign immunity.’” The Court
recognized that the present
case did not necessarily fit
within this holding, but determined, with the agreement of
the parties, that tribes, like
states, “are not subject to suit
under § 1983.” With this
determination in place, the
Court focused on the issue as presented by the parties and said
that “[a]s we have recognized in other contexts, qualification of
a sovereign as a ‘person’ who may maintain a particular claim
for relief depends not ‘upon bare analysis of the word person,’
but on the ‘legislative environment’ in which the word
appears.’” The Court concluded, “Section 1983 was designed
to secure private rights against government encroachment, not
to advance a sovereign’s prerogative to withhold evidence relevant to a criminal investigation.” Therefore, the Court said,
“[W]e hold that the Tribe may not sue under § 1983 to vindicate the sovereign right it here claims.”

[A] 7-2 Court
held a shareholderdirector may
qualify as an
“employee” under
the American with
Disabilities Act.

EMPLOYMENT LAW:
FEDERAL EMPLOYERS’ LIABILITY ACT (FELA)

In Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Ayers,56 Justice Ginsburg
delivered the opinion of the Court, which held: (1) mental
anguish damages are recoverable under the Federal Employers’
Liability Act (FELA) by an employee suffering from actionable
asbestosis if the claim is part of asbestos-related pain and suffering damages and the fear is genuine and serious; and (2) a
railroad employer is not entitled to reduction in damages for
the contributory negligence of a non-railroad employer.
Section 1 of FELA57 “renders common carrier railroads ‘liable in
damages to any person suffering injury while . . . employed . . .
if the injury or death resulted in whole or in part from the [carrier’s] negligence.’” With respect to a claim under FELA,
“Congress did away with several common-law tort defenses
that had effectively barred recovery by injured workers.”
Turning to its decisions in Consolidated Rail Corporation v.
Gottshall,58 and Metro-North Commuter R.R. v. Buckley,59 the
Court said that “stand-alone emotional distress claims not provoked by any physical injury, for which recovery is sharply circumscribed by the zone-of-danger test; and emotional distress
claims brought on by a physical injury, for which pain and suffering recovery is permitted.” The Court concluded, therefore,
that plaintiffs who suffer from asbestosis, but not cancer, can
recover damages for fear of cancer under FELA without proof
of physical manifestations of the claimed emotional distress
with two important caveats: first, it must be a part of his
“asbestosis-related pain and suffering damages,” and second, he
must “prove that his alleged fear is genuine and serious.”
The Court next considered the second issue in the case:
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whether the trial court “erred in instructing the jury ‘not to
make a deduction [from the damages awards] for the contribution of non-railroad [asbestos] exposures’ to the asbestosis
claimants’ injuries,” and concluded that it did not. The statutory language supports the trial court’s instructions: “Every
common carrier by railroad while engaging in [interstate commerce], shall be liable in damages to any person suffering
injury while he is employed by such carrier . . . for such injury
. . . resulting in whole or in part form the negligence of . . .
such carrier.”60 The Court said the conclusion that “FELA
does not mandate apportionment is also in harmony with this
Court’s repeated statements that joint and several liability is
the traditional rule.”
EMPLOYMENT LAW: AMERICAN WITH DISABILITIES ACT

In Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. Wells,61
Justice Stevens, delivering the opinion for a 7-2 Court, held a
shareholder-director may qualify as an “employee” under the
American with Disabilities Act (ADA). The Court determined
that the question was answered by applying common-law principles of the master-servant relationship and determining
whether that person acts independently and participates in the
managing of the organization, or whether the individual is subject to the organization’s control. Referencing its decision in
Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden,62 the Court stated,
“When Congress has used the term ‘employee’ without defining it, we have concluded that Congress intended to describe
the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by
common-law agency doctrine.” The ADA does not provide
much insight and “simply states that an ‘employee’ is ‘an individual employed by an employer.’” Therefore, the Court will
look to common-law principles to define the term. At common law, which is in accord with the view of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, the relevant factors
defining the master-servant relationship focus on the master’s
control over the servant.
The Court rejected the argument that it should answer the
question by asking whether the shareholder-director appears
to be the functional equivalent of a partner, concluding partnerships may include hundreds of members, “some of whom
may well qualify as ‘employees’ because control is concentrated
in a small number of managing partners.” Furthermore, the
Court determined that the Ninth Circuit’s view, which did
indeed pay “particular attention to ‘the broad purpose of the
ADA,’” could not be adopted because it ignored two important
considerations: (1) “the congressional decision to limit the
coverage of the legislation to firms with 15 or more employees
has its own justification that must be respected—namely, easing entry into the market and preserving the competitive positions of smaller firms” and (2) “congressional silence often
reflects an expectation that courts will look to the common law
to fill gaps.”

60. 45 U.S.C. § 51.
61. 123 S.Ct. 1673 (2003).
62. 503 U.S. 318 (1992).

THE JUDICIARY: FEDERAL MAGISTRATE ACT OF 1979

In Roell v. Withrow,63 a 5-4 Court held that a party’s consent
to having any or all proceedings in a civil matter held before a
magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. section 636(c)(1) does not
need to be express and may be inferred from a party’s conduct
during litigation. Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the
Court. The Court first concluded that 28 U.S.C. section
636(c)(2) and Rule 73(b) require “advance, written consent
communicated to the clerk” by the parties for a magistrate
judge to hear the proceedings. However, given the language of
the statute and the Rule, the Court concludes that, aside from
the fact that § 636(c)(2) and Rule 73(b) require specific written consent and that neither of these provisions are only “advisory,” “the text and structure of the section as a whole suggest
that a defect in the referral to a full-time magistrate judge
under § 636(c)(2) does not eliminate that magistrate judge’s
‘civil jurisdiction’ under § 636(c)(1) so long as the parties have
in fact voluntarily consented.”
THE JUDICIARY: ARTICLE IV JUDGES

In Nguyen v. United States,64 a 5-4 Court, in an opinion written by Justice Stevens, held an appellate panel consisting of
two Article III judges and one Article IV judge did not constitute an appropriate panel. Petitioners, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
section 1294(4), appealed their convictions in a federal district
court to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Two of the
three judges on the panel were Ninth Circuit Article III judges
and the third judge, the Chief Judge of the District Court for
the Northern Mariana Islands, was an Article IV judge.
Petitioners did not challenge the make-up of the panel until
their petition for certiorari before the Court. The Court began
with “the congressional grant of authority permitting, in certain circumstances, the designation of district judges to serve
on the court of appeals.” The statute, 28 U.S.C. section 292(a),
authorizes “the chief judge of a circuit to assign ‘one or more
district judges within the circuit’ to sit on the Court of Appeals
‘whenever the business of that court so requires.’” The statute
“does not explicitly define the ‘district judges’ who may be
assigned to the Court of Appeals.” The Court concluded, however, that other provisions of law make it perfectly clear that
Article IV judges are not included. The Court also concludes
that petitioners’ failure to raise the issue earlier in the proceedings did not bar the claim. The Court said that it was confronted with a “fundamental” question of “judicial authority”
in this case. The appointment is one that “could never have
been taken at all,” not one “which could have been taken, if
properly pursued.” It was impermissible from the start and
was not a waivable error.

eration of the changed cir[A] 5-4 Court
cumstances issue instead of
held an appellate
determining the issue in the
first instance. In this case, panel consisting of
respondent petitioned for
two Article III
asylum based upon “fear and
judges and one
threat of persecution ‘on
account of’ a ‘political opin- Article IV judge did
ion.’”
His petition was
not constitute an
denied by the immigration
judge and by the BIA. The appropriate panel.
Ninth Circuit reversed the
BIA’s holding, determining
the evidence “compelled” such a contrary finding and, furthermore, “changed country conditions,” which were not considered by the BIA, warranted a different result. In reversing
and remanding the case to the BIA for consideration of this
issue in the first instance, the Court determined the ordinary
remand rules applied and the Ninth Circuit’s decision not to
remand the case “seriously disregarded the agency’s legallymandated role” and “independently created potentially farreaching legal precedent about the significance of political
change in Guatemala,” without giving the BIA the opportunity
to address it first.
ELECTIONS: JUDICIAL REDISTRICTING

In a per curiam decision, the Court in Immigration and
Naturalization Service v. Ventura65 held that the Ninth Circuit
should have applied the ordinary rules of review and remanded
the case to the Bureau of Immigration Appeals for its consid-

In Branch v. Smith,66 Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for the
Court, holding a district court could, pursuant to 2 U.S.C. section 2c, create a redistricting plan instead of ordering at-large
elections pursuant to 2 U.S.C. section 2a(c)(5). Mississippi
failed to create and submit for preclearance a redistricting plan
after the 2000 census. In anticipation of the March 1, 2002
state deadline for the qualification of candidates, “Beatrice
Branch and others filed suit in a Mississippi State Chancery
Court in October 2001, asking the state court to issue a redistricting plan for the 2002 congressional elections.” In
November 2001, John Smith filed a similar suit in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi,
“claiming that the current district plan, dividing the State into
five, rather than four congressional districts, was unconstitutional and unenforceable.” He also asked the court to enjoin
the state court’s redistricting plan. Initially, the district court
declined to act, but, when it became clear that no new plan
would be forthcoming, it “enjoined the State from using the
Chancery Court plan and ordered use of the District Court’s
own plan in the 2002 elections and all succeeding elections
until the State produced a constitutional redistricting plan that
was precleared.”
The Court addressed the issue of “whether . . . the District
Court was governed by the provisions of 2 U.S.C. § 2c; or . . .
by provisions of 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c)(5).” The Court wrote, “The
tension between these two provisions is apparent: Section 2c
requires States entitled to more than one Representative to
elect their Representatives from single-member districts, rather
than from multimember districts or the State at large. Section

63. 538 U.S. 580 (2003).
64. 123 S. Ct. 2130 (2003).

65. 537 U.S. 12 (2002).
66. 123 S.Ct. 1429 (2003).

THE JUDICIARY: REMAND TO THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION APPEALS

Spring 2003 - Court Review 29

2a(c), however, requires multimember districts or at-large
elections in certain situations.”
The Court recognized that prior
to the enactment of section 2c,
many district courts reviewing
redistricting plans “had suggested that if the state legislature was unable to redistrict to
correct malapportioned congressional districts, they would
order the State’s entire congressional delegation to be elected at
large.” The Court concluded, “With all this threat of judicially
imposed at-large elections, and (as far as we are aware) no
threat of legislatively imposed change to at-large elections, it is
most unlikely that § 2c was directed solely at legislative reapportionment.” In support of this conclusion, the Court said
that “every court that has addressed the issue has held that §
2c requires courts, when they are remedying a failure to redistrict constitutionally, to draw single-member districts whenever possible.”

[T]he Court
held that it was
a matter for the
arbitrator to
interpret and
apply rules of
the NASD.

ELECTIONS: SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT—
PRECLEARANCE

In Georgia v. Ashcroft,67 the Court, in an opinion written by
Justice O’Connor, decided that when determining whether a
redistricting plan results in a retrogression of a minority
group’s “effective electoral franchise,” a court must look at the
plan on a statewide basis and make a determination in light of
the totality of circumstances, not only whether a minority
group can elect the candidate of its choice. After the 2000 census, Georgia created a senate redistricting plan and sought preclearance pursuant to section 5 of the Voting Rights Act by filing an action for a declaratory judgment in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. The district court,
after having reviewed ample evidence from both sides, “held
that Georgia’s State Senate apportionment violated § 5, and was
therefore not entitled to preclearance.” The Supreme Court
reversed on the grounds that the district court had failed to
consider all the relevant factors when examining whether
Georgia’s Senate plan resulted in a retrogression of black voters’ effective exercise of the electoral franchise. The Court
noted that section 5 “has a limited substantive goal: ‘to
[e]nsure that no voting-procedure changes would be made that
would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.’” To determine if the plan should be precleared, a court
must determine whether the plan leads to a retrogression in
the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective
exercise of the “electoral franchise,” a concept the Court
undertook to delineate for the first time in this case.
First, the Court concluded that “in examining whether the
new plan is retrogressive, the inquiry must encompass the
entire statewide plan as a whole.” Second, “any assessment of
the retrogression of a minority group’s effective exercise of the

67. 123 S. Ct. 2664 (2003).
68. 538 U.S. 510 (2003).
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electoral franchise depends on an examination of all the relevant circumstances,” i.e., “assessing a minority group’s opportunity to participate in the political process.” The Court noted
that the “totality of the circumstances” is not limited to “the
comparative ability of a minority group to elect a candidate of
its choice.” The Court pointed to another factor important for
consideration—“the extent to which a new plan changes the
minority group’s opportunity to participate in the political
process.” Last, the Court said that in “assessing the minority
group’s opportunity to participate in the political process,” a
court can “examine the comparative position of legislative
leadership, influence, and power for representatives of the
benchmark majority-minority districts.”
IMMIGRATION: DETENTION PRIOR TO
REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS

In Demore v. Kim,68 the Court reviewed and upheld the constitutionality of section 236(c) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act,69 which provides that “the Attorney General
shall take into custody any alien who is removable from this
country because he has been convicted of one of a specified set
of crimes.” Forgoing a hearing to determine whether he was
covered by section 1226(c), respondent filed a petition for
habeas corpus attacking the constitutionality of section
1226(c). Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, found the
provision constitutional. The majority began by noting the
statute, which “mandates detention during removal proceedings for a limited class of deportable aliens—including those
convicted of an aggravated felony,” was adopted “against a
backdrop of wholesale failure by the INS to deal with increasing rates of criminal activity by aliens.” In the end, “Congress
enacted 8 U.S.C. § 1226, requiring the Attorney General to
detain a subset of deportable criminal aliens pending a determination of their removability.” The Court followed by stating, “‘In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and
immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be
unacceptable if applied to citizens.’” While “[i]t is well established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process
of law in deportation proceedings,” the Court, nonetheless, has
recognized “detention during deportation proceedings as a
constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process.”
OTHER SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS: INDIAN TUCKER ACT

In United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe,70 the Court
held the 1960 Act creating a tribal trust in favor of the White
Mountain Apache Tribe gives rise to Indian Tucker Act jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims over the tribe’s suit for
money damages against the United States. In 1960, Congress
enacted a statute that provides that the “‘former Fort Apache
Military Reservation’ would be ‘held by the United States in
trust for the White Mountain Apache Tribe, subject to the right
of the Secretary of the Interior to use any part of the land and
improvements for administrative or school purpose.’” In 1993,
the tribe “commissioned an engineering assessment of the
property, resulting in a finding that as of 1998 it would cost

69. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
70. 537 U.S. 465 (2003).

about $14 million to rehabilitate the property occupied by the
Government . . . .” In 1999, the tribe sued the United States in
the Court of Federal Claims claiming damages in this amount,
“citing the terms of the 1960 Act, among others, and alleging
breach of fiduciary duty to ‘maintain, protect, repair, and preserve’ the trust property.” The Court of Federal Claims dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
because under the Tucker Act, which invests the Court of
Federal Claims with jurisdiction over action by tribes against
the United States, the waiver of sovereign immunity is only
applicable “when underlying substantive law could fairly be
interpreted as giving rise to a particular duty, breach of which
should be compensable in money damages.” In a 5-4 decision,
the Court, with Justice Souter writing for the majority, reversed.
The Court first recited the basic rules of subject matter
jurisdiction: “Jurisdiction over any suit against the
Government requires a clear statement from the United States
waiving sovereign immunity.” The Tucker Act contains such a
waiver “giving the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction to
award damages upon proof of ‘any claims against the United
States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of
Congress.’”71 The Indian Tucker Act72 “confers a like waiver
for Indian tribal claims that ‘otherwise would be cognizable in
the Court of Federal Claims if the claimant were not an Indian
tribe.’” The Court then noted that “[n]either Act, however,
creates a substantive right enforceable against the Government
by a claim of money damages.” However, the 1960 Act creates
such a right, providing a “fair inference that an obligation to
preserve the property improvements was incumbent on the
United States as trustee” based on “elementary trust law,”
which “confirms the commonsense assumption that a fiduciary actually administering trust property may not allow it to
fall into ruin on his watch.”

parties would likely expect that an arbitrator would decide the
gateway matter. Thus procedural questions that grow out of
the dispute and bear on its final disposition are presumptively
not for the judge, but for an arbitrator to decide. The Court
concluded that the NASD time limit rule closely resembles the
gateway questions that the Court has found not to be “questions of arbitrability,” but a question presumptively for the
arbitrator to decide.
OTHER SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS:
SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION

OTHER SIGNIFICANT DECISIONS:
ARBITRATION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW

In Nike, Inc. v. Kasky,74 the Supreme Court initially granted
certiorari to decide two questions: (1) “whether a corporation
participating in a public debate may ‘be subjected to liability
for factual inaccuracies on the theory that its statements are
commercial speech because they might affect consumers’ opinions about the business as a good corporate citizen and thereby
affect their purchasing decisions,’” and (2) assuming it was
commercial speech, “whether the First Amendment permits
subjecting speakers to the legal regime approved” by the
California Supreme Court. After 34 briefs were submitted and
oral argument heard, the Court decided to dismiss the writ “as
improvidently granted.” Justice Stevens, with whom Justice
Ginsburg joined, and Justice Souter joined only as to part,
wrote to concur in the dismissal because he said that “the
Court’s decision to dismiss the writ of certiorari is supported
by three independently sufficient reasons: (1) the judgment
entered by the California Supreme Court was not final within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1257; (2) neither party has standing to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court; and (3) the
reasons for avoiding the premature adjudication of novel constitutional questions apply with special force to this case.”
Justice Breyer, dissenting, wrote that in his view, “under similar circumstances, the Court has found that failure to review an
interlocutory order entails ‘an inexcusable delay of the benefits
[of appeal] Congress intended to grant.’”

In Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,73 Justice Breyer
delivered the opinion of the Court. Here, the Court held that it
was a matter for the arbitrator to interpret and apply rules of
the NASD. In this action, an arbitration agreement was in
place between the parties that allowed the petitioner to choose
the forum. She did, choosing the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) and signing the NASD’s uniform
submission agreement, which stipulates that no dispute shall
be eligible for submission after six years has elapsed.
Respondent filed an action in the district court arguing that the
six-year time period had lapsed. The Court began by stating
“the ‘question of arbitrability,’ is ‘an issue for judicial determination unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide
otherwise.’” The “question of arbitrability” as a “gateway dispute” hinges on whether the parties would have been likely to
expect a court to have decided the gateway matter. At the same
time, the Court has found the phrase “question of arbitrability”
not applicable in other kinds of general circumstance where
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